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RIPARIAN OWNERSHIP IN LAKES ANT)

PONDS.

INTRODUCTI ON.
A lake is defined by Webster as being a

large

body of water, contained in a depression in the earth's
surface, and supplied from the drainage of a more or
less extended area.

A pond is defined by the same author

as a body of water, naturally or artificially confined
and usually of less extent than a lake.

Angell, in his

work upon Riparian Rights, defines a pond as a lake of
small size.
christ, J.,

In State vs. Gilman, 14 N. H. 467, Gilsms the matter up as follows: "The material

difference between a lake and pond is in size; the distinction, however, as applied to artificial ponds, is
somewhat indefinite. The word pond may mean a natural pond
or an artificial

one, raised for manufacturing purposes,

either permanent or temporary.

In both cases the limits

of such bodies of water may vary at different times and
seasons by use or natural causes. Therefore, different
rules of construction may apply in different jurisdictions.
ponds will

"

However, as the subject of artificial
not be touched upon in this thesis, it will

branch.

be unnecessary

to go further

into that particular

"The mere fact

that

a current from a higher to

there is

a lower level, does not make
otherwise

be a lake,

and

that a river which would

the fact

that a river

swells

out into broad, pond like sheets, does not make that a
lake which would otherwise be a
mitted that

the water is

Where

river.

it

is ad-

not a lake nor a pond,

material difference between

the

which is size, the only

criterion by which to determine whether it is a river,
is the existence of a current. The question cannot be
determined by ascertaining what appellation has been
given it;

the name cannot alter

the

thing."

It seems,

therefore, that the main test to distinguish between a
lake arid pond is the question of size.

CHAPTER I.

at

of occupation give superior right,

priority

Did

common law ?
may perhaps

It

the discussion

seem that

lows upon the common law doctrine of prior

fol-

which

appropriation

as giving one an exclusive right to the use of waters,
applies only to running streams,

and not,

therefore,

bodies of still

water such as lakes and ponds.

however,

the case.

is

not

of the country,
lakes
little

in

England.

There

and at this late day, as will be
to the title

non-tidal

is,

very early law bearing directly

tion as

Such,

Owing to the peculiar nature

there are but few strictly

to be found

to

therefore,

but

upon the subject,

seen later, the ques-

to land under lakes and ponds has

never been directly

settled.

I

think,

therefore,

the discussion which follows will apply as well

that
to lakes

and ponds as to running streams.
The doctrine
to

that one may

the use of a lake

or stream of water in

manner or to a particular
priation
the early

of it,

acquire an exclusive

extent,

a particular

by mere prior appro-

was at one time quite well founded

English law.

right

One of the earliest

in

cases was

that of Williams vs.

Moreland,

2 B & C 913,

decided in

1824. The plaintiff in this case was the owner of cer4

tain land,
use of

by reason of which he was entitled to the

a stream of water running through the property

and used by him for domestic purposes. The defendant
erected a dam higher up the stream and diverted the
water from its

usual

tiff. Bailey, J.,
Court:

course, thereby injuring the plain-

in delivering the opinion of the

"My judgment in this case is founded upon the

nature of water, and the manner in which an exclusive
right to its use is obtained. Water is publici juris.
So soon as it is appropriated by an individual, his
right is coextensive with the beneficial use to which he
appropriates it. Subject to that right, all the rest of
the water remains publici juris. The party who obtains
the right to the exclusive enjoyment of the water does so
in derogation of the primitive right of the public. Now
if this be the character

of the right to water, a party

complaining of the breach of such right ought to show
that he is prevented from having water which he has
acquired the rirht

to use for some beneficial

purpose.

In Higgins vs. Iye, 7 Bing. 692, it is held that by the

law of England

the person who first

appropriates

any

part of the water flowing

through his own land to his

own use,

the use of so much as he thus

has the right

to

appropriates against any other. In Bradley vs. Shaw, 6
East 207

the doctrine of the superior

right

of the

first appropriater is recognized, and goes even further
giving

the right

the same way a

of other riparian

similar priority

appropriated by the first

in

taker. To

owners to acquire
the residue left
the same

in

un-

effect is 2

Blackstone's Commentaries, 402.

These cases would seem

to fix

water could only be

the rule that property

acquired by appropriation,
might

take

it

all,

show that

that one rparian
just

appropriater
the

However, as we proceed, later cases

the rights of riparian

more substantial

to a

and the first

to the exclusion of others upon

same body of water.
will

in

foundation

owners have a

than mere appropriation,

owner cannot be deprived

of

his

amount of the water by being anticipated

and
right

in

its

use by his neighbor. The leading modern English case
upon

this

subject

is

Mason vs.

Kill,

5 B & A 1. In

this

case the defendant erected a mill on his own land. The

grantor,

plaintiff's
the

same stream,

who was the owner of land below on

and had used the water of

a license

to erect

the license,

but

The

the water

taken by him was returned
land.

the use of a mill.

and conducted
Later plaintiff

upon his land, and appropriated
plis

defendant's dam,

and gave

The defendant

thereupon
aJJ

verted from plaintiff's

mill.

contains
point,

The opinion,

a review of all

into a

use all

Later he

him notice not

down, by means of which

for damages.

it

without

the water at
Plaintiff

the sur-

destroyed

to divert

the

times was dibrought action

very thorough and

the authorities
the

a mill

erected a new dam lower

which is

shows that neither

resevoir

erected

to its

water not used by defendant.

water.

The defendant,

into

diverted th'e water of certain springs which

flowed into the stream,
for

take

defendant availed himself of

the stream above plaintiff's
license,

defendant

point and to

his dam at a certain

what water he pleased.

the

gave

purposes,

twenty years for domestic

the stream

up

to this

cormmion law nor the

civil

law affords any support for the mischievous doctrine, as
it

is

termed,

that

the first

occupant

or appropriater of

water,
ity

by his mere

of riFpht

proprieters

priority,

acquires

therein as
on the same

such a

should deprive
stream

superior-

other riparian

the benefits

to be derived

A

therefrom.

Mr. Chief Justice Denman, who wrote

ion, goes on to show that
as a

the opin-

the Roman law considered water

bonum vacums, in which anyone might acquire a

property; but as public or common in the sense that any
one might apply it to

the necessary purposes of support-

ing life, and that no one had any property in water itself, except in that particular part which he might abstract and of

which he had the possession, anid during

the time of such possession only. Upon the

particular

point as to the rights of the appropriater of water in a
stream he says:

"The position that the first occupant

of water, for a bereficial
it., is true in the sense
water nor divert it. In
jury

to real

our law,

the first

that no one can pen back the
this, as in other cases

of in-

property, possession is good title against

a wrong doer.
in

purpose, has good title to

It

appears to us that there is no authority

nor so far as we know,

occupant has any right

in

the Roman law,

that

to deprive other ovners

of land upon the same body of water, of the special

ad-

vantages of the natural

flow thereof.

The principle de-

duced from this case seems to be that a ripar lan owner
gains no additional or more extensive

rights in

a

body of water to the detriment of others on the same,
by being the first to apply the water to a beneficial
use.

His rights depend upon his riparian ownership,

and his prior appropriation is
pre-existing right.
riparian owner,

but the exercise of a

If he exceeds his privelege as such

he usurps other rights and unless con-

tinued so long as to raise the presumption of a grant,
it

gives him no additional

rights in

the water.

The only

practical advantage he gains by such prior appropriation
is

that in

ages will

case of a disturbance of his right, his dambe measured by his beneficial use. To the

same effect is
Ex. 59.

It

Holker vs. Perritt, Law Reports, 10

should be said,

however,

that as soon as a

person has appropriated water to a beneficial use,

he

may sue for any injury done to him respecting such new
use. Entry vs. Owen,
It

6 Ex.

352.

seems to be settled beyond a doubt that the early

English doctrine never gained a foothold in the United
States,

and it

is

well

settled that mere prior occupancy

or appropriation of the waters
parian owner,

of a stream by a ri-

can give no exclusive right thereto as

against others on the same stream,

with the following

exceptions in

some of the States: 1. Unless

occupation is

continued for such a length of time as

to raise the presumption of grant.
12 Vt. 178.

Davis vs.

the prior

Fuller,

2. Where the common law has been modified

by some local custom, usage, or statutory enactment, as
for instance, the Massachusetts mill acts.
ing the general American doctrine,

As sustain-

see Palmer vs. Mul-

ligan, 2 American decisions, 270. Platt vs. Johnson, 15
Johns. 213; Norton vs. Bigelow, 16 American

Decisions,

696; Tillman vs. Tilton, 5 N.H. 231; Parker vs. Hotchkiss, 25 Conn. 321; Dennett vs. Kellar, 29 Mich. 420;
Angel on Water Courses Sec. 134 and 350; Pomeroy on
Riparian Rights,
It

Sec.

6.

will hardly be necessary to go into a detailed

examination of all
the same general

these very early cases, as they have

tendency,

and I will therefore

one or two of the leading cases.
supra,

a leading case upon

select

In Palmer vs. Mulligan,

this subject,

the facts were

as fol

ows:

claimed

Plaintiff

an action

to have been sustained

erection

by

for damages

to his mill

dam by the

the defendant of another miii

thus diverti.ng
mill

brought

the water.

Held,

above his,

the act of erecting

and

the

by defendant was a lawful act, and though it in-

jured the plaintiff, he was without remedy. Each one had
an equal
it

right

to buiild his mill,

will not be restrained because of sonie inconvenience

to the other;

and

doctrine

the person erecting

that

this

case emphatically

acquired any superior

similar state

says:

"Of a

of facts;

appropriation

the

consent

first

mill

the
thereby

same body of water.

opinion,

Story J.,

there may be an ap-

or grant.

Mere prior

consent or grant,

exclusive right. It is not like the case

force of his priority

where

the first

occupant

of occupation.

already existinF-

takes by

That supposes no

and no right of use already

acquired. But our law annexes to
the right

rejects

case arising out of

of water without such

of mere occupancy,

ownership

in

a

thing common by nature,

propriation by general

confers no

the

rights upon the

In Tyler vs. Wilkerson, supra,
a

and the enjoyment of

the riparian proprieters

to the use in common, as an incident to

the

land, and whoever seeks to

found an exclusive use must

establish a rightful appropriation in some manner admitted by the law, which may be either by grant from
all

the proprieters whose interests are effected, or by

long exclusive enjoyment without interruption, which
affords a just presumption of right; and it is well
settled that as prior occupancy or use of water does
not give

exclusive possession, so a man does not lose

any of his rights in a stream by mere non-user, nor
does such non-user confer any adverse rights upon another."

See also Townsend vs. McDonald, 12 N.Y. 381.

From an examination of the cases cited, I think we
can with safety Jay down the following, as the doctrine of both England and the United States .

The wa-

ters of streams and inland lakes and ponds, are common
alike to the use of all riparian proprieters upon its
borders. This extends to lakes wholly inland and territorial.

Each proprieter may use the water for all

reasonable purposes, provided that he does not interfere with the public easement of navigation, in all
lakes and streans navigable.

But he must after its

use,

return it

without substantial

diminution in

quantity

to its natural bed or channel before it leaves his own
land,

so that it

may reach the adjacent proprieters in

its

natural condition . No priority of use or occupation
can give him any higher or more extensive rights that
these,

as against other proprieters higher or lower

upon the stream,

or abutting upon either side of him,

upon the shores of the lake. More extensive or exclusive
rights than these against other riparian owners, can
only be acquired by grant from them, or by prescription,
which presupposes a former grant.
ter, 92 N.Y. 463. However, the

See Smith vs. Roches-

doctrine above stated

as to the rights of riparian owners,
to the vast fresh water
Country,

does not apply

lakes or inland seas of this

nor to the streams forming the boundary of the

States.
It

will be remembered that I gave two

to the rule that priority
perior rights.

exceptions

of appropriation gives no su-

The second exception was where it

is

modified by local custom or some statutory enactment.
The best example of the latter is in Massachusetts. From
a

very

early period in

that state,

statutes have existed

providing for the encouragement of mill s,

the effect

of which has been to modify somewhat the rights of riparian owners.

These statutes authorize

one having a

mill site upon his lands to flow the lands of other
proprieters on the same body of water for the purpose
of getting power sufficient to run his mill.

The

effect of these statutes seems to have given the riparian owner who first

appropriates

the water of a

stream to mill purposes, the right, by virtue of this
priority,

to maintain his dam against others,

although

it may prevent the erection of mills by them. Carey vs.
Daniels, 41 American Decisions, 532. Gould vs. Water Co.
13 Gray 442.
however,

This exclusive right must be reasonable,

and this superiority of right exists only to

the extent of the actual appropriation and use.
unappropriated

The

residue may be the subject of a new

appropriation by others; but the later

decisions of

that State have so limited the doctrine as to make it
difficult to discover any essential difference between
it

and the ordinary rule.

193,

it

is

In

Ellen vs.

laid down that each

R.

R.

riparian owner

10 Cush.
has a

right to a just and reasonable use of the water which
flows through his land,

and so long as he does not

wholly divert or appropriate it,
any more than is

reasonable,

or does not appropriate

other riparian proprieters

cannot complain; and in Thurber vs. Morton, 2 Gray 352,
it is said in determining what is a reasonable use, a
just regard must be had for the force and volume of the
water and the state of improvement of the Country,
general usage in

similar cases.

have statutes similar to
prevail there.

It

is

and

Maine and Minnesota

these,

and similar doctrines

to be borne in mind that these

rules are peculiar to the States mentioned,

and are

solely the result of statutes and are not recognized in
other states. With this,

I

the question as to title

to waters of a lake or pond,

think,

we have discussed

have shown that mere priority of appropriation,
between

riparian proprieters,

or priveleges.

and

as such,

gives no exclusive rights

We will now pass to a discussion of the

question as to the title to land under lakes and ponds
as between riparian proprieters.

CHAPTER II.
In

discussing this question,

it

naturally falls

into two divisions: 1. Title to the beds of
pond, and, 2.

the lake or

Lakes and ponds as boundaries; but as the

first naturally leads into the second, they will be
discussed in
In

one Chapter.

considering

there will

be found a

especially in

the United

this head,

great diversity of opinion,

States, while in England the question does not seem to
have been given much attention; in fact, in some respects
it

may still

be considered as an open one.

This may

not seem so strange, as England proper contains but few
non tidal lakes,

strictly
tance.

and they are of small

impor-

The question regarding the rights of the Crown to

the land under lakes,

seems to have first

come up in

1863 in the case of M1arshall vs. Navigation Co., 3 Best
and Smith, 732. The plaintiff in this case was the possessor of a right of fishing by grant in
of Wellswater Lake,

in

certain parts

the north of England.

The de-

fendant company, being incorporated for the excursion
business,

started to run their steamboats on the lake,

and did so for a time.

The lake being shallow in places,

the steamboat company, by allowing their vessels to
dump their ashes, cinders, refuse etc. in the water,
eventually drove the fish away. Defendant justified on
the ground that the lake was a public highway and that
they navigated by license obtained from the riparian
owners along shore. In considering the case, Wightman L,
says!

"Whether the soil of lakes, like that of fresh

water rivers prima facie belongs to the owner of the
lands,

or of the manor on either side of it,

prima facie to the King,
tive, it is not necessary
however,

in

or belongs

the right of his preroga-

to deternine. It is clear,

that the soil of the land,

covered 1ith water,

may together with the water and right of fishing therein,
be especially appropriated by a 1,hird person whether
he have the

land or not,

ders thereof."

adjacent

Accordingly

thereto on the bor-

the question stood in

this

condition until 1878, when the case of Bristow vs.
Cormican, Law Reports 3

Appeal

cases 643. Plaintiff

here claimed the right to fish extending over the whole
of Lake Lough,

one of t'e largest non-tidal

lakes in

Ireland, including a place where it was claimed defendant trespassed.

Plaintiff

based his claim upon a

grant from Charles II. in 1660 and upon certain leases
since made by persons claiming title iunder the grant.
It was positively laid down in this case that the Crown
has no de jure right to the soil or fishings of an inlanmd non-tidal lake, and a general
a right of fislaing in a lake is

grant by the crown of

not, without more,

suf-

ficient to establish title thereto; and t where there is
no evidence of acts of possession by the grantee at the
particular point in dispute, can have no effect. There
is no authority to show that the Crown is

of common right

entitled to land covered by water, where the water is
running water forming a river, but still
a lake.

not

water forming

While these cases do not establish much one

way or the other regarding the particular point in
question, they do establish two propositions which are
not fully recognized in this Country. 1. That the title
to the bed of a lake or pond is
thority. 2.

That the

bounds it, is

not in

the soverign au-

bed of a lake and the shore which

susceptible of distinct ownership by dif-

ferent persons.

In

coming

to the question

becomes one of vast importance,
States which,

like

New York,

the United States, it

in

especially in those

are dotted

borders by lakes large and small.

throughout

their

Whether the line of

low water mark or high water mark is

to be

considered as

a boundary, is a question as to which there are differences of opinion throughout

the States.

ners do not own the bed,

must be

owned by the State.
original owner,
admission

Wherever

to the Union,

with all

owns

is

is,

the soil

its

other rights pertaining
owns it

perhaps,

as pro-

one of the

main points.

If

sell

private improvement and occupation, and the

it for

it

to the State on

Whether the state

or only as soverign,

conceded that it

the United States was the

the right passed

to eminent domain.
prieter

it

the bank ow-

If

as proprieter,

it

may

bank owner may be cut off from any use of the water in
connection with his

estate,

fits which he had reason to

and be deprived of the benesuppose he had acquired

absolutely by his purchase. But if the State owns it as
soverign merely,

under the right

to be preserved as a

of eminent domain,

right of navigation,

merely for

it

is
the

common enjoyment of all

the people. Where lakes are

possession of under the power of eminent
tions of property
to arise.

In

of ice for

rights

those states

use in

connected
where

domain,

taken

ques-

therewith are bound

the gathering and storirg

summer and for shipping away is

car-

ried on, the question is one of great practical importance.
It

may for a moment be profitable

great navigable lakes in

to discuss the

the United States,

or as

they

are more properly called, the great inland seas. As

to

the shores of the sea and rivers as far up as the tide
ebbs and flows,

the

common 2aw of England provided

the ownership of lands went to
no further.

began,

the high water mark,

The shore proprieters

termed riparian,
or at

the water,

but his title

that point where

and the

flow by the tide;
navigable,

Crown owned

that

had certain rights
stopped where the

sea

the highest tide carried
the strip

subject

to over-

but as to fresh water streams, not

the title

of the proprieter

on either

side

extended to the middle or thread of the stream.
In

this

and

Country

the great lakes are

regarded as

public property,

and not susceptible

ship any more than

of private owner-

the sea. 3 Kent's Commentaries, 429.

In Canal Appraisers vs. The People, 17 Wend. 571,
the opinion it is

said:

"A

different

in

rule than that of

the common law must prevail as to our large navigable
lakes, which are mere inland

seas,

though

there is

neither ebb nor flow of the tide, and also as to
lakes and streams which foyti

the natural

those

boundaries

between us and a foreign nation. Our own local law
appears to have assigned

the shores down to

the low

water mark, to the riparian owners, and the

beds of

the lakes to the public."

It is made to differ from a

sea boundary because the space between high and _Jow
water mark on the ocean is subject to the overflow by
the

tides, and is therefore useless for all purposes

of agriculture; but the great lakes have no

tides, and

the difference between high and low water mark is not
periodical, and although they do sometimes overflow
their banks,

the waters recede again, and only overflow

at long and irregular intervals, so

that in the mean

time the land can be used for tillage and pasture. R.R.
vs. Valentine, 19 Barb. 484.

But in Ledyatrd vs.

Ten-

Eyck, 36 BarU. 102, it is held that a Pike five miles
in length and one mile in width would pass under a
grant of a large tract of land which included it

within

its boundaries, and in Wheeler vs. Spinola, 54 N.Y.377,
it

was held that the rule that proprieters of land bor-

dering upon streams of water in which the tide ebbs
and flows own only to high water mark, is not applicable to a case where; by cutting a channel between a
pond and a body of salt water,

the water of the former

becomes salt and the tide ebbs and flows therein.

In

such case the rights of the riparian proprieters are
not affected thereby.
We will now pass to a discussion of the small er
lakes and ponds,

in which we have a variety of hold-

ings.
The question regarding the smaller lakes and
ponds in this State,

with regard to the boundaries of

the riparian proprieters thereon,

may still

in some re-

spects, by regarded as an open one. Lands under the
waters of navigable lakes seem to be placed on the
same footing as lands under the water of navigable

rivers,

and it

requires a specific grant to enable the

riparian proprieter to go beyond the shore.
vs.

People 5 Wend.

427.

It

may be said that by Statute

in New York, ( 1 Rev. Stat. 573),
to land

Canal Co.

under navigable waters is

the State's title
held in

trust for

the owners of the up-land as well as for the public,
and the State can only convey
waters,

the lands under such

whether lakes or tide-waters,

to the owner of

the adjoining land. See also Rumsey vs. R.R. 114 N. Y.
423; Wright vs.
It

is

hard to lay down a rule as to where

shall be drawn.
within

Eldred, 46 Hun 12.
the line

What lakes shall be treated as coming

the settled rule,

and what as being within the

rule applying to fresh water streams. Are you to follow the rule in

the case of the Great Lakes,

at the low water mark,
streams,

or take

and stop

the rule as applied to

and carry the proprieter's line to the center.

Navigability can hardly be said to be a fair test, for
all ponds,

even,

are more or less navigable.

When the

State makes a grant of land which includes within its
bounds the whole of a pond or lake, of course it grants
to the individual

the bed of the lake. Ledyard vs. Ten

Eyck,

supra.

But if

the grant is

bounded by the lake,

the line could hardly be carried further than the margin, as the rule protecting the State from any implication in its grant would produce this result. Now let
us take a case for instance,

where a grant of land is

made including a lake as large as lake George in this
State,

or Oneida Lake,

or any of the lakes in the

central part of this State,

midway in size between the

Great Lakes and the smaller ones.

Now conceding to the

grantee ownership in the bed of the lake, how are his
deeds bounded by the bed of the lake,
Does his title
If

to be construed.

extend to the water line or further ?

further, where will the boundary be.

stream;

there can,

therefore,

no

be no ownership as at

common law under fresh water rivers.
necessity would compel

There is

In this case,

the application of the rule as

adopted it,R. R. Co. vs. Valentine, to wit, lands bordering upon a lake go to low water mark; but this rule
requires that ownership of the b .d of the lake should
be held subservient to the title to its
owners title

goes to the water; if

it

shores.

The land

gradually sub-

sides,

as it

does in almost all lakes,

line gradually enlarges,
cut

the shore owner's

and he cannot therefore,

be

off from the Lake by a grant to another person.

boundary line
said that

is

there is

the grantor will
subject

always the water,
a covenant

owner's

its

hold the title

estate

waters;

as it

that

it

may be

running with the land that
to

to the right of the shore

bounded by

so

His

the bed of the lake,
owner always to be

shrinks in

increases by accretion.

size,

the

shore

The grantor can-

not do what the State asserts its right to do respecting
lands bounded by the sea or the great rivers,
sell

the strip

any attempt

between high and low water mark;
to use

the land under water

shore owner's parcel,
or else limit

his

the shore owner is

rights

to

the water.

as a

riparian

and ascertained

because

front of a

owner.

rights,

Now while
he rmst

according

free access to his boun-

He has the exclusive

the water over his own land,

useful

wit,

would conflict with his boundary,

this rule. He is entitled to

dary line,

in

bounded by the pond or lake,

have certain definite
to

to

and if

right of access

he can make it

to him for any purposes of navigation he may

do so.

He may fish

rights

incident

and cut ice upon

to his boundary line,

for when he pays for the land,
from him even under the right
compensation.
to the land,

it.

These are

the

bought and paid

and ought not to be taken
of eminent

domain,

without

These are rights which are appurtenant
and cannot be taken

away.

While there

is no positive authority in New York, settling the
question regarding very small lakes,
of authority

tends

These deductions,
haps

to support the
however,

as here laid down,

to strangers

are per-

the land between high and low water

mark. In the case of small lakes,
of land;

the shore owner's

We hawe seen that

it

another land under
ing would
shore.

take only
But even

of the bed and
riparian

title

there is no such strip
going to the water.

would be incompatible

owner for the proprieter

The

rule as here given.

incompatible with the right claimed by the State

to sell

the

the decided weight

to the

who had sold to him,

the water,
subject

sell

to

and the person so purchas-

to the rights of

allowing that seperate

the shores exists,

owners have

to

shore

the right

what

is

the owner of

ownership
the result

to build docks out

?
to

the line of navigability,

and they cannot be cut off

from access to the water.

What title

ger take
bare

to land under
with all

title,

then, can a stran-

the water ? He takes simply the

the rights connected with ownership
covered with water,

The land acquired is

granted away.

which cannot be made useful

to him,

and the condition

of his tenancy is that is shall so remain
water,

for in

just proportion as it

covered With

ceases to be so cov-

ered, it ceases to be his. Therefore it will be seen
that whether the owner of the shore be bounded by the
lake, as is

upheld by this rule,

bed of the lake,
in

there is

or be held to own the

but ver' little

his rights or the value of his holding.

difference
Perhaps,

if

anything, his dominion oVer the water is more perfect
when he is

bounded by it,

own the fee in

than if

the land beneath its

hu should be held to
surface.

He may

fish the whole lake under a sort of ccrrion right of
piscary,

created by owning the lands upor

while if

his right depended upon the ownership

its borders,
of the

soil beneath the water, he would be limited to that part
of the lake

the soil of which was within his bounds.

His ri'ht

to cut ice is

a common right

which he has

with the other shore proprieters.

If

cut ice depended upon his title

the bed of the lake,

to

his

right

to

he would be strictly confined within his own lines.
There

is

a very

close analogy between

and the old [1nglish
were not for

common lands.

The

the use of the public

where".prescription has established
them,
the

in

the

small lakes

common lands
general,

a highway

across

but for the use of the tenants of the manor,

right

to use them was strictly

appurtenant

tenancy of other lands held in severalty.
march of population,

these lands,
them.

except

In

it

has become

necessar

to the

With the
to divide

and destroy the right of canmon use in

such cases the vested rights of the tenants

of the manor have been extinguished by purchase.
any of these small lakes,
right of eminent domain,

therefor e,

however, that a grant of
the bed of the lake,

Should

be taken under the

compensation would have to be

made to the shore proprieter.

estate in

and

It

must be borne in mind,

land, which included expressly

would of aourse vive the grantee an

the land under the water.

I have endeavored

to collect
Wi ]

all

the authorities

be found

to throw any light

Appraisers vs.
36 Barb.

in

102;

People,

5 Wend.

Canal fund vs.

New York

state,

upon this

matter:

1; Ledyard vs.

Kendall,

which

TenEyck,

26 Wend.

418;

R.R. vs. Valentine, 19 Barb. 484; Kingman vs. Sparrow,
12 Barb.

201; "'organ vs.

Kine,

35 N.Y.

454;

and

in

gerL ral, see Dillingham vs. Smith, 30 Maine 370;

Strange

vs. Biermujler, 34 Ohio 492; Payne vs. Woods 1.01 Mass.
160;

and Angell on Water-courses,
We will

found
this

in

now proceed

the different

41 - 43.

to discuss

states.

the rule as it

Owing to

the length of

thesis, I will not attempt to give a detailed ac-

count of the rule
out one or two

in

each State,

but will

simply pick

of the leading cases.

In Fletcher vs. Phelps, 28 Vt. 257, it

was held

that lands bounded on Lake Champlain and upon the
which empty into
tain
to

that body of water,

the same level

later

case,

as the waters of the lake,

Austin vs.

the bank owner,

ponds,

in

R.R.

45 Vt.

205,

it

mainextend

but in

right

in

a

was held

the case of small lakes and

has no appurtenant

streams

and ordinaril.,

the edge of the lake at low water mark;

that

is

the water which

will enable him to maintain ejectment agEinst one who
would take possession, and fill in and occupy the bed
of the ;ond below the wter line in front of him.
In Illinois, a deed of land in which one boundary
was described as following the course or" Lake i[ichigan
was held to bound the land by the line at which the
water usually stands when free from disturbinr
Seaman vs. Smith, 24 Ill.

52].

in Ohio, with a reservation

causes.

This rule is followed

in regard to the rights

of the riparian owner to build out beyond his strict
boundary line for the purpose of affording such convenient walls and landing places in aid of commlerce, as
do not obstruct navigation. Sloane vs. Biermuller, 34
Ohio State 492.
In Wisconsin the, boundary is held to be the ordinary low boundary line,
The Court says;
"But while

in

but with appurtenant water rights.

Delaplaine vs.

the riparian

R R.

42 Wis.

proprieter only takes

425:
to

the

water line, it by no mea-ns follows that he can be deprived of his

riparian rights without

corpensation.

These are private rights, incident to the ownership of
the

shore which he possesses distinct from the

rest of

the public.

All

the facilities which the location of his

land with reference to

the lake affords, he has the

to enjoy for the purposes of gain or pleasure.

right

It

is evident from the nature of the case, that these
rights

of user and exclusion are connected with the

land itself, grow out of its location, and cannot be
materkvlly abridged or destroyed without inflicting an
injury upon the owner whi.ch the

law should

redress. It

may be remarked tirat these riparian rights are not
common to

the citizens at large, but exist as incidents

to the right of the soil itself, adjacent to the water.
In other words, according to the uniform doctrine of the
best authorities, the foundation of riparian rights is
the ownership of the bank or shore. In such ownership
they originate. They exist though the fee of the lake
be seperate from the ownership of the shore.

If

the pro-

prieter owns the bed of the stream or lake , this j,,a., poss'-bly give him

some additional

rights do not depend

rights; but his riparian

upon that fact, strictly speaking."

In Michigan, we come to

the first radical diversion

from the general line of authorities. In Rue vs. Ruddington,

10 J'ich. 125,it was held that the rule appli-

cable to Lake
Lake
of

M-uskegon,

smatll

M4ichigan by an outlet

lake separated

only,

is,

that

from

the ownership

the land bou nded upon the lake carries with

ownership
later

of the land under the water,

case o- Clute vs.

held

that

and in

65 Hich.

subdivision

it

48,

the

the
it

of land

was
upon an

owns the soil under the water of such

lake, which would be
lines

Fisher,

the owner of a

inland lake,

its

a

included within

were fully extended.

the

subdivision if

But the practical

dif-

ference between this ruling and that of Wisconsin is
not so great as might at first
bank over

is

limited in

the use of it

not proprieter

seem,

the proprieter of the bed also,
only by

of the bed,

The State or proprieter

the public

he Viay still

limited only by the general

pi-blic

cannot either

take from him his appurtenant

or in

the navigation

thereof,

In Wisconsin it is also held
is

the same,

the

he is

right;

if

make use of it,

right of navigation.

sale,

ownership

because if

by regulation or
rights

without

in

the water,

compensation.

that the rule of bank

whether the water is

of navigation or not. Boorman vs.

susceptible

Sunnocks, 42 Wis.233.

Nevertheless,

if

accretions are fo-med on the shore of

a non-navigable pond or lake by slow and imperceptible
degrees,

or if

the bed is uncovered by the Eradual re-

ceding of the waters,

the land thus made or uncovered,

belongs to the proprieter of that which adjoins it.
Therefore if
gether,

a lake or pond gradually disappears alto-

the adjoining proprieters will become owners of

the whole bed, and vould find their possessions increased
several

times the original size. Jones vs. Johnson, 18

Howard 156. Also see Belding vs. State, 25 Ark. 120;
MUlnlicipality

vs.

Cotton press,

Hodgers vs. Belden 95 No.

Cal.

18 La.
331.

An.

122;

and

But the question

as to the gradual or slow disappearance of

the waters is

not such an important matter,

for generally the lakes

and ponds gradually recede if

at all,

the exceptional
other states,
dictions,

ruling ,as

and whether under

in Michigan and one or two

or the general holding of ctll

the juris-

their beds come at last to be private property

without any grant from the State.
Maine holds in

accordance with the New York doc-

trine, although not without a conflict in her decisions,

In

the early

it

was held that where a lake had been

case of Bradley vs.

Rice,

13 Maine 198,
raised by arti-

ficial means, so as to permanently extend beyond its
natural limits,

a grant of land bounded by

should be limited by its

artificial

margin,

sent condition,

existed at

the

conveyance.
4

i

or as

it

the lake
in

its

pre-

time of the

Later, in Wood vs. Kelly, 30 Maine 47,
upon a

similar statement of facts

it

was

held -that a grant bounded by the lake included all

the

land which was uncovered when

low-

the wtter was at

its

est.
Indianna seems to have gone the farthest
holding adversely

Turner vs.

Rice 121 Ind. 51, it was held that non-navibrought

regardingA navigable

streams,

to the center.
it

was laid

down

In

within the comtimon law rule
and purchasers

Ridgeway vs.

that

title

take

title

Ludlow, 58 of Ind. 48,

by adverse possession

land bordering upon a lztk.e gives

title

to

to the center.

Ohia also holds with Indiana and Michigan,
not without strong dissent,

rule.

In

the states

gable lakes must Ie

to the general

of any of

although

and the rule may be re-

Nywe,

t

a lake,

Lemback vs.

and conveys a

the presump-ion

thereon,

bordering

In

was held that wh-re one oivns a

it

of land which surrounds

tract
part

227,

8 L.R.A.

way.

either

garded as not well settled

is

that

the

tle of the purchaser extends to the center thereof.

Two judges,
In
test,

however,

New Jersey

thmt of

dissented

this case.

in

they apply

exceptional

the somewhat

the ebb and flow of the tide,

to deter-

mine whether waters are private or public.
some of the western states,

In

it

and Colorado,

modern riparian

is

laid down

rights

is

that

imsuited

and the rights of

the country,

notably Nevada
the doctrine of the
to

the condition of

the adjoining proprie-

ters are to be determined by the application of
doctrine of prior appropri-tion.

Reno vs.

the old

She-nman,

4

L.R.A. 60 and 767.
I

think,

from a reading of the foregoing cases,

that the prevailing doctrine
applicable

particularly
somewhat
lows:

in

in

this Country,

as to large lakes,

the case of artificial

regaTIed as

and qualified

ponds, to be as fol-

That While a general grant of land on a

river

or

stream which is
grantee
grant

extends

the line of the

to the middle or thread of the current,

to a

natural

water's edge,
lowing states:
consin,

riot navigable

and this
New York,

Illinois,

necticut.

pond or lake extends
rule has
11aine,

Vermont,

only

the dupport

to

vate - roperty.

the whole or

Reynolds vs.

none of it

Commonwealth,

fol-

Wis-

ard Con-

In Pennsylvania a pond or small lake

sidered an entirety,

the

of the

New Hampshire,

Massachusetts

a

is con-

being pri-

93 Penn.

458.

CHAPTER III.

RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
Riparian
the term,

are

ownership

of

rights,

according

the banks of streams,

proprietecs,

of sufficiently7
and littoral,
the

fresh,

The distinction

is

both riparian

in

relating

to riparian rights,

since

ownership

denote

tide waters and

and private waters

a material question

the

be no word

sometimes used to

essarily

per depend upon

to

to include

between

public

or lakes.

tide waters are called,

broad meaning

or between

rivers,

and there appears

although each

other.

meaning of

such as follow or are connected with the

Those whose lands border upon
littoral

to the strict

dete-mnining

is

not nec-

questions

riparian

rights pro-

of lands contiguous

to the

water and are the same whether the proprieter

of such

lands owns the

Go1-id on

Waters,

Sec.

existence
come

soil under the water or not.

145.

of a

It

is

riparian

right,

ill contact with the water,

as good as vertic-1l.
Lords cases 349.

necessary

of course
that

the land should

but lateral

Casemore vs.

for the

Richards,

contact is
7 House of

In
heads;

discussing
I.

these

Private

rights they

rights;

2.

Public rights,

gained by custom and long usage.
are divided into (])
ice;

(3) Wharfage;

Access;

two

or those

The private

rights

(2) Right to cut and take

(4) Fishing;

rights are divicied into

fallunder

(5) Accretion.

Public

(1) Navigation, and, (2) The

quasi public right of fishing, in

several of the

states.

The leading case upon the question of access is
that of Delelaplaine vs. R.R. 24 Am. Ren. 386. A railroad company

.n

this case constructed

its

road to Lake

Monona, a navigable body of water in Wisconsin. By doing
so

they cut off the riparian owners from access to

lake,

and left

in

front of their

the

land a pool of stagnant

water. It was contended by the company that because
was authorized by its
tween two certain

charter to construct

points,

the construction of its

it had the right

its

it

road be-

to occupy, in

road-bed, any land in the state

between these points. By the Court:

"It may be conceded

that the company had the right by its charter, to occupy
the

bed of the Lake

but

this

in

the construction

does not imply an interitior

leLislat1;re to relieve

the company

cn

of its

road;

the part of the

from its liability

in

case of injuryr
douibtless

to a riparian owner.

intended that

of its

chartered power,

damage

inflicted

was

The legislature
in

the company,
would make

compensation

upon any land owner,

imposed at

constructing its

commor, law.
road,

the execution
for any

where liability

The act of the railroad in

plainly

shows an interference

with a natural flow or action of the water, an obstruction of access to and from the lots of the plaintiff to
the body of the lake. It is

therefore, a permanent in-

jury to the property, and a reduction of its market
value. We are at a loss to understand why the plaintiff
should not recover such damages for this infringement
upon and destruction of his riparian rights, as he may
prove he has actually sustained. These riparian rights
are undoubted elei'ents in the value of property thus
situated.
tiff

If
has not

property,

destroyed,

can anyone claim that the plain-

suffered a

special damage

different

both in

degree

sustained by the general public".

in

respect

and kind,

to his

from that

This case is

also

in accordance with the English line of decisions upon
subject;

the

see Lyon vs. Fish Monger's Co. Law Rep. L App.

Cases, 662.

Also Steamship Co. vs.

348; Brisband vs.
waukee,

10 Wall.

R.R.Co.

R.

R.,

23 M1inn.

114; Yates vs.

Mil-

497.

On the other hand,
vs.

ngine Co. 12 R.I.

C N.Y.

522,

the ver'y early case of Gould
w'1vich was decided prior to

Yates vs. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, held that as the
owners of land joining a navigable river have no right
of property in

its

high water mark,

they are not entitled to compensation

waters,

or in

its

shores below

where a railroad constructed under a grant from the
legislature

cuts off all

lands and the river.
resulted in

It

communication between such
is

claimed that this doctrine

New York from the civil law doctrine,

cable to the Hudson,

which was the river in

applt-

question.

This doctrine which rests upon the ground that the injury suffered by the riparian owner,
degree,

is

the same in

general public,
owners,

though greater in

kind as that sustained by the

and by those who not being riparian

have occasion

to approach

the river over that

part of the bank occu pied by the road.

This doctrine is

sipported by Tomlin vs. R.R. 32 Iowa 106, Strauss vs.

R.R. 34 N.J.Tjaw 532.
Where it

is

conceded

are property rights,
being corpensated
said that

however,

that riparian

the question of their

for,

is

well

settled;

encroached

upon by later

can hardly be said
sent day,

taking without
and it

the early case of Gould vs.

R.

decisions in

R.

very doubtful.

riy be

has been so

New York

to be of much authorit

or at least

rights

at

that
the

Strong vs.

it

pre-

R.R.

90

N.Y. 122.
The right
and lakes,
their

of riparian

to

land,

construct

walls,

piers,

in

owners upon navigable
shoal waters in
landings etc.

in

rivers

frontof
aid of nav-

igation, is so well settled it hardly needs much space.
This right,
tion that

however,

dependant upon

the bank.
by

by

Its

the State,

private

always subject

tc. the qualifica-

the structures must not pass beyond the point

of navigability.
not

is

right,

the public.
The right

It is held to be a riparian right,
title

to the bed,

but upon title

to

exercise may be regulated or prohibited
but

so long as

it

is

not prohibited it

is

derived from a passive or implied license
Gould on waters,

Sec.

of fishing may depend

179.
to a great extent

a

whether the ownership of the bed of

upon the question

becoming

therby

ship of

the bed.

public,

if

state or the bank o-ers,

the

that is

If

not,

it

in

the state,

is

generowner-

the

the

belongs to the bnk

Beekman vs. Kramer, 44 Ill.
33 N.J. 369,

It

public or private.

either

the right of fishing follows

ally held that

is

in

lake or pond is

the

fishing

proprieter.

447. In Cobb. vs. Davenport,

the whole subject is very fully considered,

and it is held that while

the right of fishing is prima

facie, exclusively in te owner of the soil, yet it is
not inseperable

therefrom, but muy be acquired distinct

from the ownership of the land beneath the lake, and
the

fact that the public in general, for a long period

of time, were accustomed to fish in a certain lake
without molestation,
tomary right in

all

simply
the

tends to establish a

inhabitants in

cus-

that locality

to

fish in these waters, if a right to fish could be established by proof of custom; but the right of fishing
is not a mere easement or right of user without derogation of

the property; but as a profit or a taking of the

property itself. Therefore, the right of fishing cannot

but must be prescribed for in

be claimed by custom,

in

term used

by which it

tions,

he has,

those former owners whose estate

and

the plaintiff

that

alleged

is

a

claiming pescrip-

in

particularly

pleading,

is

as used here,

term Que estate,

(The

estate,

"Que"

a

have iimem-

oriably exercised the right claimed. Black's Law DicIn

tionary.

to an easement in

right

if

other words,

one

claims a prescriptive

another's lands,

owning or occupying land to which such

right is

said to claiyu a Quo estate,

is

he

tenant,

b.' reason of

and it

appuris

only in this forrq that a claim of a profit a prctendre
can be sustained.

by prescription

the fomier ar; rights

are mere rights

and the latter

of profit,

that

in

from an ease-'rent,

differ

a pretendre

Profits

of convenience

without profit.)
question of the right to cut and take

Upon the
ice,
it

rules conflict

the

is

governed by

il].river

vs.

8 1,Tich.

18.

pe:,rhps,
therefore

the same

Smith,
It

is

sorewhat.

a

a

few of the states

462;

Lorman vs.

question of as great

detail

to fishint_.

rules applicable

34 Conn.

as any regarding
bear little

In

riparian

importanice,
and will

rights,

discussion.

Benson,

It

,-qa-

be

rle, that the owner of an

laid dova- as a fundamental

easement to overflow another's land,
to

forms on

the ice which

may ar se from the soil, and ra,

make such vise of the

as is not inconsistent with the

91

ler,

Ind.

The owner of a

to all the profits which

servient estate has a right

observed in

not entitled

the water covering the land;

it belongs to the owner of the fee.

soil

is

vs.

case of Hydraulic Co.

the leading

A6 was

easement.

But-

134, "NotWithstanding such easement, there

remains with the grantor the right of full

dominion and

use of the land except so far as a limiting of their
ownership is essential
easement granted.

to

Neither is

grantor should expressly
may exercise consistentlyi
the grant. Such

the fair enjoyment of the
it

necessary

that

the

reserve any right which he
with the fair

enjoyment of

rights remain with him because they

are not granted, and for the same reason tle
of any of them cannot

exercise

be complained of by the grmntee,

who can claim no other limitations upon the rights of
the

grantor but such as are expressed in the grant, or

necessarily
ment.

implied in

the right of reasonable

Easements do not take

enjoy-

from the owner of the fee

the right
not

perty,
right

to make any

profitable use he can

to back or pond water on the land of another,

not injurious

also Paine vs.

to

Woods,

the easement,
108 Mass.

the b.d of

in

owner of the ice

in

the

ice field,

owner,

the

stream above

liable

the

dam,

the

though the ice privelege

When the owner of a mill

in

the

owner is

the riparian

the water from a pond,

he is

stream,

but none in

the water,

such case,

made by the flowage.

maliciously draws

Prick,

Baker vs.

5 B & Ad. 1; Julian vs.

and that

ice formed ijpon it,

160;

See

produce.

dam on a navigable

that the owner of a mill

has a qualified interest

will

In a Maine case it was held

Woodsmall, 82 Ind. 568.

own

which a use

nor the profits

45 Md. 339; Mason vs. Hill,

who did not

gives no

or prescription,

to the land itself,

right

is

The

estate.

inconsistent with the dominent

whether acquired by statute

of,

of his pro-

damages

who owned the land under

darn

and thus destroys
to the

the pond.

riparian

Stephens vs.

Kelly, 78 Maine 445. In the earlier case of Dwyer vs.
Morris, 72 Me. 181,
mill privelege,

mill

it was held that a deed of a tide
dam,

and wharf

privelege,

and

the right

to flow a creek and adjoining lands,

-nd all

rights connected with and belonging to said mill privelege, gave the grantee rio riiht

to cut ice nor titl

e to

the ice fonried upon a fresh water pond raised by changing
the dam so as to exclude salt water.
In

New York,

a case of some interest arose upon the

following facts: One
suit,

S.,

at the time of bringing the

was the owner of the land upon which the dam in

question was raised,
of the pond,

and the land covered by the waters

except a small portion owned by 0. 0 by

deed conveyed to the grantor of S.

the right and priv-

elege to overflow so much of the land above men'ioned
as is

now

or at any time after, ma.' be overflowed by

means of the said dam,
be erected in

or by any other dam which may

place of this one.

Later, M and R,

whom plaintiff was survivor purchased all
the pond,

formed and to be formed,

the gathering of the ice

in

the ice in

from S.

the pond,

of

Previous to

a freshet occurred

which carried away a large part of the ice for ed and
loosened that which was in

controversy from the shore,

and wojld probably have swept that out also,

had not

plaintiff,

to the

by holes cut

therein,

fastened it

shore and thus detained it.
menced

to remove

the ice,

After the pihintiff

had com-

the defendant went

to

this part

of the pond over O's land, and by perviission of 0, took
a

large quantity of ice,

though forbidden by plaintiff,

and also opened a channel

across

the

pond and over

that part of which S had title, and floated the ice so
cut by him through
the same.
the

It

was held that

ice fonied in

owner,

was laid

the plaintiff

was entitled

the water overflowing

to

the lands of the

third person by permission

down by

the Court

water's use and the mode of its
use,

arid gathered and sold

and could recover the ice which had been taken

therefrom by a
It

such channel

was not

restricted

which he held,
one that

that

of such owner.

the manner of the

appjication

to his own

by any deed conveying

title

nor by any rule of law except the general

the flow of a natural

stream shall not be so

obstructed as to deprive owners below of the benefits
of use ard enjoyment

. So long as the owners below were

not

S,

interfered with,

plaintiff's

owner of the bqsin which held
to use such water for

vendoras
the water,

his own profit.

the former

had the right

He could use its

momentum to propel machinery,
use

He coild

the water for farm and domestic purposes,

them was his,

The land basin which held
fee,

All

these conthem.

the act of appropriating

follow from

sequences

that ri&it to othes.

rent that ri E-1t to others.

and

and Iet

and let

as owner in

or for use. By his dam he had filled the basin,
or held there was his,

and the water thus gathered
subject

only

joyment of

to the exception

that

the

beneficial

en-

the owners below should not be interfered

with, just as much as if he h ad gathered them for his
a

own use and benefit in

purpose.

constructed for that

When

the

form of

his rights

right

fore it

to sell

returned to its

and dispense

it

when

changed by cold into

its

congealed

and permit it

it

in

right to use and sell

ice,

vendor,

the plaintiff's

S.,
in

to use it

The

only a part of his right.

the water is

are the same.

had the riht
same

form is

liquid

water Jin its

tank or cistern which had been

form,

and

the

to be gathered be-

liquid state as he had to use
the Latter condition.

be no difference as to his rights,

There can

growing out of the

state of the water. Myer vs. Whittaker, 55 Howard's

Practice,

376, overruling Marshall

vs. Peters, 12

Howard's Practice 218.
On the other hand,
34 Conn.
pond

462,

it

is

in

Manufacturing Co.

laid down

own the ice foymed upon

prieters

have no right,

that
it,

vs.

Smith,

the owners of a mill

and the riparian pro-

as owners of the

soil,

to remove

it.
Where a person takes the ice in

the water over the

land of another,

to which the owner of the land has

exclusive

the measure of damages in

right,

such wrongful

taking is

the

trespass for

the value of the ice as soon as

it is a chattel, that is,

when scraped, sawed, cut,

and

ready for removal.
Public Rights:
have what is

the small

the latter
be allowed

or quasi-public

to permrit

in

INichigan,

the public

to take

trespass,

fish

MIarsh vs.

ColY ,

that
39

in

has alfish

in

Therefore,

in passing upon ano-

from the lake

has given notice

it

they

rights

to take

ponds and lakes of the State.

in that State it is no
land,

by custom,

States,

For instance,

ways been customary

ther's

certain

known as common,

lakes and ponds.

all

In

or pond,

unless

such conduct will not
:iich.

626.

State vs.

Company

etc. 48 N.H. 250. Also see Cobb vs. Davenport,

32 N.J.Law 369, contra.

In Ohio it is held that the

right

Erie and its

ited
ritht

of fishing in
to-the proprieters
of fishing in

were subject

Lake

bays,

of the shores,
these waters

is

is

but that

not limthe

as public as if

to the ebb and flow of the tide.

they

